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1. Introduction 
In linear public goods experiments it is well established that subjects tend to behave 
as conditional cooperators, that is, people increase their own contribution when other 
people increase theirs (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). 
Fischbacher et al. (2001), showed that almost half of subjects are conditional 
cooperators and one third are free riders. These figures are confirmed by Kocher et al. 
(2008)1. However, the conditional cooperation is not perfect: the presence of free 
riders results in a decay of contributions over time.  
Subjects’ behaviour in public goods game may depend on different factors. 
For instance, on one hand, it might depend on the geographical area where the public 
good game is played and associated cultural differences – e.g. the level of 
collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). However, there is abundant literature – see for instance 
Brandts et al. (2004), Hermann and Thöni (2008), Kocher et al. (2008), and 
Martinsson et al. (2013) – showing that, regardless to geographical differences, 
people tend to contribute more as the others’ contributions increase, i.e. conditional 
cooperation is a universal behaviour. 
Another factor that may affect the outcome of the public good game is the 
number of players in decision-units. Indeed, many papers investigated differences 
between individual and group behaviour in many contexts. For instance, in signalling 
game Cooper and Kagel (2005) demonstrated that “two heads are better than one”, 
since two-persons’ teams played more strategically than individuals. In a beauty-
context game Kocher and Sutter (2005) found that two-person groups, when 
competing against individuals significantly out-perform them. Additionally, Sutter 
(2005) found that larger groups (i.e. four-person teams) accomplished better results in 
a beauty-context game than two-person teams and/or individuals. Also in the 
ultimatum game, teams were more rational than individuals (see Bornstein and Yaniv, 
1998). By means of a laboratory experiment, Morone et al. (2016) studied how 
individuals and groups behave in a simple game such as the dollar auction. They 
found that groups are closer than individuals to the Nash equilibrium. Similar results 
were reached by Morone et al. (2014) who	 provided an experimental test of the 
																																																								1	They found that in US 80.6% of the subjects are conditional cooperators and 8.3% are free riders, in 
Japan 41.7% of the subjects are conditional cooperators and 36.1% are free riders, and in Austria 
44.4% of the subjects are conditional cooperators and 22.2% are free riders.	
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traveller’s dilemma using individual and group data, showing that groups behave 
more rationally, in the sense that they were always closer to the Nash equilibrium. 
In public goods game, if the marginal per capita return is less then one, the 
Nash equilibrium is free riding. In this paper we investigate whether the number of 
players per decisional unit may affect the salience of conditional cooperation. Thus, 
we report on experimental study, which test if and to what extant dyads are 
conditional cooperators. To do so, we build on Fischbacher et al. (2001), applying the 
same variant of the strategy-method (Selten, 1967) to dyads. The experimental design 
is described in Section 2 and we illustrate our main results in Section 3. In Section 4 
we discuss our conclusions.  
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
As mentioned, our experiment replicates Fischbacher et al. (2001) on dyads. It was 
programmed in z-Tree2 (Fischbacher, 2007). We run three sessions between April and 
May 2016 at the ESSE laboratory of the University of Bari, Italy. We enrolled 64 
participants (students majoring in Economics and Marketing), i.e. 32 dyads.  
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly coupled with a 
partner. In turn, each dyad was randomly matched with other three dyads, so that four 
dyads make one group.  
Each dyad was endowed with 20 tokens. Dyads had to decide how to allocate 
these tokens. They could either keep tokens for themselves or invest them totally or 
partially into a “public good”. The payoff of each dyad is described by the following 
function: 
πi = 20 - gi + 0.4Σgj 
where gi is the contribution of the dyad i to the public good, and Σgj is the sum of the 
contribution of each dyads in the group. The payoff of all the contributions to the 
public good is 0.4.  
Participants received the sheet with instructions. Once they read it, they had to 
answer some control questions (an English translation of instructions and control 
questions is reported in annex A). Afterwards, the actual experiment began. Dyads 
went through two steps: the first step was called “unconditional contribution”, while 
the second step was called “contribution table”. During the unconditional 																																																								2	We would like to thanks Urs Fischbacher to share with us the original software used in 2001. 
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contribution step, each dyad had to state how many of the 20 tokens they wanted to 
allocate for the public good. There was no time limit for this decision. Once the first 
decision was taken, they passed to the second. In this step, dyads had to fill out a 
contribution table, indicating how many tokens they would allocate to the public good 
for each possible average contribution level of other dyads in the same group (ranging 
from 0 to 20 tokens). Again, no time limit was applied. When all the dyads in the 
same group completed all the tasks, one dyad per group was picked randomly. Only 
for this dyad, the contribution table was used to calculate the payoff. For the other 
three dyads in the group, the unconditional contribution decision was the relevant one 
for the payoff calculation. On average, each dyad earned 30€ (25€ + 5€ of show up 
fee).  
 
3. Results 
As can be noticed from Figure 1, the average dyad’s contribution to the public good 
(squared-line) increases as the average contribution of other dyads increases too.  
The main result of our study is that also little groups (such as dyads) tend to 
behave as conditional cooperators, in contrast with the expectation of group’s 
behaviour closer to the Nash equilibrium of contributing zero.  
 
FIGURE 1 - Average contribution of the single couples for each average contribution level of other 
dyads in the group 
A breakdown of findings showed us the same heterogeneity of subjects found 
in Fischbacher et al. (2001), and confirmed by Kocher et al. (2008). We classified 
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them in four categories. We defined “conditional cooperators” those couples whose 
contribution increased monotonically with the increasing of other couples’ 
contribution; in line with Fischbacher et al. (2001), we also considered “conditional 
cooperators” those couples whose contribution did not follow a perfect monotonic 
trend, but obtained a positive and significant (at 1% level) Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient when compared to others’ contribution. In our sample, eleven dyads 
(34.4%) behaved conditionally, even though no one played a perfect conditional 
cooperation.  
We identified six “free riders” (18.8%), namely dyads that did not contribute 
at all to the public good, regardless others’ contribution level. Finally, according to 
the categorization made in Kocher et al. (2008), we classified as “hump-shaped” 
seven dyads (21.9%) whose contribution was first monotonically increasing when 
others’ average contribution was x<20 tokens and then decreasing above this value x.  
Trends of other dyads did not match any recognizable pattern (Table 1). Figure 
B1 in the annex B shows the behaviour of single dyads. 
In conclusion, to a complete knowledge of our research, the total average 
unconditional contribution of dyads to the public good has been 7,03 tokens (35,2% 
of endowment). 
Contributors 
 
Distribution 
Avg. unconditional 
contribution 
    	Conditional cooperatives 34,4% 8,3 
	Free Riders 
 
18,8% 0,8 
	Hump-shaped 21,9% 8,4 
	Others 
 
25% 8,8 
	TABLE 1: Distribution of dyads categories 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
A growing body of experimental research is focusing on differences between 
individual and groups behaviour in different context. Previous literature highlights 
that groups in different strategic games tend to make choices closer to the Nash 
equilibrium. However, in the present experiment, we found that dyads mostly 
exhibited a conditional cooperative behaviour (34.4% of cases), in line with findings 
obtained with individuals (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Nevertheless, no one dyad acted 
as a perfect conditional cooperative team and – on average – their contributions were 
lower than others’. Free riders percentage stopped at 18.8%.  
Future research should investigate whether larger groups (e.g. four members) 
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tend to make choices closer to the Nash equilibrium, increasing the number of free 
riders when a one-shot public good game is played.  
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Annex A 
Experimental Instructions 
 
You are now taking part in an experiment which has been financed by various 
foundations for research promotion. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can, depending on your decision, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
The instructions which we have distributed to you, are solely for your private 
information. It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we 
shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
During the experiment we will not speak of Euro but rather of points. During 
the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the 
experiment the total amount of points you have earned will be converted to Euro at 
the following rate: 
 
1 point = 0.50 Euro. 
 
All participants will be divided in groups of four members. Except us, the 
experimenters, nobody knows who is in which group. 
 
The decision situation 
You will learn later on how the experiment will be conducted. We first 
introduce you to the basic decision situation. At the end of the description of the 
decision you will find control questions  that help you to gain an understanding of the 
decision situation. 
You will be a member of a group of 4 people. Each member has to decide on 
the division of 20 tokens. You can put these 20 tokens on a private account or you can 
invest them fully or partially into a project. Each token you do not invest into the 
project will automatically be transferred to your private account. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
For each token you put on your private account you will earn exactly one 
point. For example, if you put twenty tokens on your private account (which implies 
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that you do not invest anything into the project) you will earn exactly twenty tokens 
from the private account. If you put 6 tokens into the private account, you will receive 
an income of 6 tokens from the private account. Nobody except you earns something 
from your private account. 
Your income from the project 
From the token amount you invest into the project each group member will get 
the same payoff. Of course, you will also get a payoff from the tokens the other group 
members invest into the project. For each group member the income from the project 
will be determined as follows: 
 
Income from the project = sum of contributions to the project × 0.4. 
 
For example, if the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 tokens, then 
you and all other group members will get a payoff of 60 × 0.4 = 24 points from the 
project. If the four group members together contribute 10 tokens to the project, you 
and all the others will get a payoff of 10 × 0.4 = 4 points from the project. 
 
Your total income 
Your total income results from the summation of your income from the private 
account and your income from the project. 
 
Income from the private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) + Income 
from the project (= 0.4 × Sum of contributions to the project) = total income. 
 
Control Questions 
Please answer the following control questions. Their purpose is to make you 
familiar with the calculation of incomes that accrue from different decisions about the 
allocation of 20 tokens. 
1. Each group member has 20 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that 
none of the four group members (including you) contributes anything to 
the project.  
a. What will your total income be?  
b. What is the total income of the other group members? 
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2. Each group member has 20 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that you 
invest 20 tokens into the project and each of the other group members also 
invest 20 tokens.  
a. What will your total income be?  
b. What is the total income of the other group members? 
3. Each group member has 20 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that the 
other three group members together contribute 30 tokens to the project.  
a. What is your total income if you – in addition to the 30 tokens – 
contribute 0 tokens to the project? 
b. What is your total income if you – in addition to the 30 tokens – 
contribute 8 tokens to the project? 
c. What is your total income if you – in addition to the 30 tokens – 
contribute 15 tokens to the project? 
4. Each group member has 20 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that you 
invest 8 tokens to the project: 
a. What is your total income if the other group members – in addition 
to your 8 tokens – together contribute 7 tokens to the project? 
b. What is your total income if the other group members – in addition 
to your 8 tokens – together contribute 12 tokens to the project? 
c. What is your total income if the other group members – in addition 
to your 8 tokens – together contribute 22 tokens to the project? 
If you finish these questions before the others, we advise to think about 
additional examples to further familiarize yourself with the decision situation. 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment contains the decision situation that we have just described to 
you. At the end of the experiment you will get paid according to the decision you 
make in this experiment. The experiment will only be conducted once. 
As you know you will have 20 tokens at your disposal. You can put them into a 
private account or you can invest them into a project. In this experiment each subject 
has to make two types of decisions. In the following we will call them “unconditional 
contribution” and “contribution table”. 
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• Whit the unconditional contribution to the project you have to decide how 
many of the 20 tokens you want to invest into the project. You will enter 
this amount into the following computer screen: 
 
 
• After you have determined your unconditional contribution you press the 
“OK” button. 
• Your second task is to fill out a “contribution table”. In the contribution 
table you have to indicate for each possible average contribution of the 
other group members (rounded to the next integer) how many tokens you 
want to contribute to the project. You can condition your contribution on 
the contribution of the other group members. This will be immediately 
clear to you if you take a look at the following screen. This screen will 
show up immediately after you have determined your unconditional 
contribution. 
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The numbers next to the input boxes are the possible (rounded) average 
contributions of the other group members to the project. You simply have to insert 
into each input box how many tokens you will contribute to the project – conditional 
on the indicated average. You have to make an entry into each input box. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the project if the 
others contribute 0 tokens to the project, how much you contribute if the others 
contribute 1, 2, or 3 tokens etc. In each input box you can insert all integer numbers 
from 0 to 20. If you have made an entry in each input box, press the OK-button. 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution 
and have filled out their contribution table, in each group a random mechanism will 
select a group member. For the randomly determined subject only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision. For the other three group members that are 
not selected by the random mechanism, only the unconditional contribution will be 
the payoff-relevant decision. When you make your unconditional contribution and 
when you fill out the contribution table you of course do not know whether you will 
be selected by the random mechanism. You will therefore have to think carefully 
about both types of decision because both can become relevant for you. Two 
examples should make that clear. 
• EXAMPLE 1: Assume that you have been selected by the random 
mechanism. This implies that your relevant decision will be your 
contribution table. For the other three group members the unconditional 
contribution is the relevant decision. Assume they have made 
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unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 4 tokens. If you have indicated in 
your contribution table that you will contribute 1 token if the others 
contribute 2 tokens on average, then the total contribution to the project is 
given by 0+2+4+1 = 7 tokens. All group members, therefore, earn 0.4 × 7 
= 2.8 points from the project plus their respective income from the private 
account. If you have instead indicated in your contribution table that you 
will contribute 19 tokens if the other contribute two tokens on average, 
then the total contribution of the group to the project is given by 
0+2+4+19 = 25. All group members therefore earn 0.4 × 25 = 10 points 
from the project plus their respective income from the private account. 
• EXAMPLE 2: Assume that you have not been selected by the random 
mechanism which implies that for you and two other group members the 
unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision. 
Assume your unconditional contribution is 16 tokens and those of the 
other two group members are 18 and 20 tokens. The average 
unconditional contribution of you and the other two group members, 
therefore, is 18 tokens. If the group member who has been selected by the 
random mechanism indicates in her contribution table that she will 
contribute 1 token if the other three group members contribute on average 
18 tokens, then the total contribution of the group to the project is given 
by 16 + 18 + 20 + 1 = 55 tokens. All group members will therefore earn 
0.4 × 55 = 22 points from the project plus their respective income from 
the private account. If instead the random number selected group member 
indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the other 
contribute on average 18 tokens, then the total contribution of that group 
to the project is 16 + 18 + 20 + 19 = 73 tokens. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.4 × 73 = 29.2 points from the project plus their respective 
income from the private account. 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each 
group member is assigned a number between 1 and 4. As you remember, at the very 
beginning a participant, namely B2, was randomly selected. This participant will, 
after all participants have made their unconditional contribution and filled out their 
contribution table, throw a 4-sided die. The number that shows up will be entered into 
the computer. If B2 throw the membership number that has been assigned to you then 
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for you your contribution table will be relevant and for the other group members the 
unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision. Otherwise, your 
unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
 
 
Annex B 
Figure B1 – The contribution trends of all single dyads1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
1 Conditional cooperators: dyads no. 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 19, 28, 29, 31. Free riders: dyads no. 9, 15, 
16, 20, 27, 32. Hump-shaped: dyads no. 5, 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 24.  
Others: dyads no. 2, 25 (unconditional cooperation of 1 token) and dyads no. 7, 11, 22, 23, 26, 30 
(random patterns).  
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